Computing Nash Equilibria and Evolutionarily Stable States of Evolutionary Games by Li, Jiawei et al.
TEVC-00118-2015.R1 
 
1 
 
Abstract—Stability analysis is an important research direction 
in evolutionary game theory. Evolutionarily stable states have a 
close relationship with Nash equilibria of repeated games, which 
are characterized by the folk theorem. When applying the folk 
theorem, one needs to compute the minimax profile of the game in 
order to find Nash equilibria. Computing the minimax profile is 
an NP-hard problem. In this paper we investigate a new 
methodology to compute evolutionary stable states based on the 
level-k equilibrium, a new refinement of Nash equilibrium in 
repeated games. A level-k equilibrium is implemented by a group 
of players who adopt reactive strategies and who have no 
incentive to deviate from their strategies simultaneously. 
Computing the level-k equilibria is tractable because the minimax 
payoffs and strategies are not needed. As an application, this 
paper develops a tractable algorithm to compute the 
evolutionarily stable states and the Pareto front of n-player 
symmetric games. Three games, including the iterated prisoner’s 
dilemma, are analyzed by means of the proposed methodology.  
 
Index Terms—Evolutionary game theory, evolutionary stability, 
folk theorem, iterated prisoner’s dilemma, Nash equilibrium.  
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
volutionary game theory has been successful in helping to 
explain many complex and challenging aspects of 
biological and social phenomena in recent decades [1, 2]. Based 
on the idea that biological organisms that are more fit in a given 
environment will tend to produce more offspring, evolutionary 
game theory provides us with the methodology to study 
strategic interactions among individuals in evolving 
populations.  
Evolutionary stability analysis is one of the major research 
directions in evolutionary game theory. It considers strategic 
interactions in the situations when mutant strategies invade an 
infinite or finite population of homogeneous or heterogeneous 
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strategies, without concerning the parameters of evolutionary 
dynamics such as the selection scheme [3, 28].  
Classical evolutionary stability analysis is based on the 
concept of evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS). An ESS is a 
strategy such that, if all the members of a population adopt it, 
then no mutant strategy can invade the population under the 
influence of natural selection [3]. According to [4], the 
condition for a strategy x to be ESS is that for any strategy 
𝑦 ≠ 𝑥, 
 
𝑢(𝑥, 𝑥) ≥ 𝑢(𝑦, 𝑥)                 (1.a) 
𝑢(𝑥, 𝑦) > 𝑢(𝑦, 𝑦)           (1.b) 
 
where 𝑢(𝑥, 𝑦) is the payoff of strategy 𝑥 when interacting with 
another strategy 𝑦. 
This condition guarantees that an ESS always outperforms 
mutant strategies so that a homogeneous population can be 
maintained in evolutionary dynamics. However, the definition 
of ESS is so strict that there is frequently no ESS in an infinite 
length or indefinite length two-player [5, 6] or n-player [7] 
repeated game. Except in specific situations, the condition of 
ESS cannot be used to analyze the evolutionary stability of 
strategies in evolutionary games.  
A population is considered to be in an evolutionarily stable 
state if its genetic composition is restored by selection after a 
disturbance [8]. In evolutionary game theory, an evolutionarily 
stable state has a close relationship with Nash equilibrium (NE) 
and the folk theorem for infinitely repeated games [9, 10]. The 
folk theorem, which is the fundamental theory of 
non-cooperative repeated games, states that any feasible payoff 
profile that strictly dominates the minimax profile is a NE 
profile in an infinitely repeated game [11, 12]. The evolutionary 
stable states are a subset of those Nash equilibria in the 
corresponding evolutionary game. 
Computing a NE is generally hard in either a one-shot game 
or a repeated game. It has been proved in complexity theory 
that computing whether a two-player 𝑛 × 𝑛 game has any NE 
in which both players get non-negative payoffs is NP-hard [13]. 
Recent results have shown that the problem of finding a NE is 
PPAD-complete, even for a two-player game, and even if all 
payoffs are ±1, which suggests that these problems are as hard 
as finding Brouwer fixed-point and thus are computationally 
intractable [14-16]. Computing an approximate NE, such as 
𝜀 −NE, is also PPAD-complete [17]. In infinitely repeated 
games, finding a NE or 𝜀 −NE of (k+1)-player games is as hard 
as finding NE of k-player one-shot games [18], unless some 
changes are made to simplify the model [19].  
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The main difficulty of this problem lies in computing the 
minimax profile because the strategy space of a repeated game 
is much more complicated than that of a one-shot game. In [20], 
a polynomial algorithm for finding a NE in a two-player 
average-payoff repeated game is designed by restricting the 
strategies of the players. Some learning algorithms, fictitious 
play for example [47, 49], assume that each player adopts a 
stationary strategy at each round. These methods are flawed if 
reactive strategies are taken into account. The computational 
complexity of finding a NE for a repeated game is still an open 
problem.  
Some specific subsets of NE are tractable. Classical game 
theorists have developed a number of refinements of NE, such 
as subgame perfect NE [21], strong NE [22], and coalition 
proof NE [23, 24], because many games, especially repeated 
games, have multiple equilibria and those equilibria can be 
significantly different in terms of simplicity, stability, and 
commitment. One can refine equilibria to distinguish them in 
which implicit commitments are credible due to incentives [25]. 
Some refinements of NE require less computational complexity 
than computing the Brouwer fixed-point or the minimax payoff 
profile. Unlike a NE, however, none of the refinements of NE 
so far guarantees its existence in a game. 
 In this paper, we propose a new refinement of NE in 
repeated games, namely the level-k equilibrium, in order to 
develop tractable and general algorithms to compute NE of 
repeated games. Based on this concept, we show that specific 
Pareto optimums of the convex hull of the feasible payoff 
profiles are NE payoff profiles. The minimax payoff profile is 
not needed in computing the level-k equilibria. We prove that 
there must be at least one level-k equilibrium in a repeated 
game.  
Symmetric games are a set of fair games in which the 
identity of any player has no influence on the result. Almost all 
evolutionary games are symmetric so that individuals in the 
population face the same situations in the evolution. According 
to the folk theorem and the concept of level-k equilibrium, we 
show that the Pareto front of the payoff profiles must be 
evolutionarily stable states in symmetric games.  
There are two novel contributions in this paper: 
a. We prove the existence of level-k equilibria, a subset of 
NE of repeated games, which are not characterized by the folk 
theorem. Computing a NE is considered to be NP-hard. We 
show that the level-k equilibria are tractable and ubiquitous in 
repeated games. 
b. Stability analysis based on ESS is not suitable for repeated 
games and evolutionary games. We propose a tractable 
algorithm based on the level-k equilibrium to compute the 
evolutionarily stable states of n-player symmetric repeated 
games.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 
introduces evolutionarily stable state and NE of repeated games 
and the relationship between them. Section 3 defines the 
concept of level-k equilibrium and discusses how a level-k 
equilibrium is implemented among a group of players adopting 
reactive strategies. We prove that level-k equilibria are a subset 
of NE, based on which an algorithm is developed to compute 
the evolutionarily stable payoff and Pareto front of an n-player 
evolutionary game in Section 4. Section 5 analyzes three games 
by means of the proposed algorithm. Section 5 concludes the 
paper.  
II. EVOLUTIONARILY STABLE STATE AND NASH EQUILIBRIUM  
An evolutionarily stable state is a state such that a 
disturbance cannot change the genetic compositions of the 
population, if that disturbance is not too large. Besides intrinsic 
disturbances such as stochastic decisions and noise in game 
dynamics, crossover and mutation in selection process are also 
sources of disturbance. 
The dynamic of an evolutionary game is generally expressed 
by the replicator equation, 
 
?̇?𝑖 = 𝑥𝑖(𝑢𝑖(𝑥) − ?̅?(𝑥))                (2) 
 
where 𝑥 = (𝑥1, ⋯ , 𝑥𝑛) is the vector of the distribution of types 
𝑖 = 1,⋯ , 𝑛 in the population, 𝑢𝑖(𝑥) is the fitness (payoff) of 
type 𝑖 , and ?̅?(𝑥) = ∑ 𝑥𝑗𝑢𝑗(𝑥)
𝑛
𝑗=1  is the average population 
fitness. It is generally difficult to acquire accurate solutions of 
the replicator equation. 
A state ?̂? is said to be evolutionary stable if for all 𝑥 ≠ ?̂? in 
some neighborhood of ?̂?, 
 
{
𝑢𝑖(𝑥) ≥ ?̅?(𝑥) if 𝑥𝑖 ≤ ?̂?𝑖
𝑢𝑖(𝑥) < ?̅?(𝑥) if 𝑥𝑖 > ?̂?𝑖
                (3) 
 
When the population deviates from the state ?̂? , due to a 
disturbance, it will be restored by a selection process.  
NE is a stable state in strategic games such that no player can 
be better off by unilaterally deviating from it. Nash has proven 
that any strategic game has at least one NE if mixed strategies 
are taken into consideration [26]. However, there is no upper 
bound of the number of NE. A strategic game may have 
multiple, sometimes unlimited, NE [48]. 
Consider an infinitely repeated n-player game 𝐺 =
{𝐼, 𝑆, 𝑈}𝑇  where 𝐼 = {1,⋯ , 𝑛}  is the player set and 𝑆 =
{𝑆1, ⋯ , 𝑆𝑛} and 𝑈 = {𝑈1, ⋯ , 𝑈𝑛} are the strategy set and the 
payoff set respectively. Let 𝑠−𝑖 = (𝑠1, ⋯ , 𝑠𝑖−1, 𝑠𝑖 , ⋯ , 𝑠𝑛) 
denote the strategy profile excluding the strategy of player i. 
The iteration of the game is counted by 𝑡, starting from 𝑡 = 0. 
Each player has a pure action space 𝐴𝑖
𝑡 in the 𝑡𝑡ℎ stage game. 
A strategy profile (𝑠1, ⋯ , 𝑠𝑛) is a NE if, for any 𝑖 ∈ 𝑛 and 
𝑠𝑖
′ ∈ 𝑆𝑖 there are 
 
𝑢𝑖(𝑠′𝑖 , 𝑠−𝑖) ≤ 𝑢𝑖(𝑠𝑖 , 𝑠−𝑖)              (4) 
 
In repeated games, the set of NE includes any feasible 
payoff profile that dominates the minimax profile, which is 
characterized by the folk theorem. 
The concept of an evolutionarily stable state is equivalent to 
the concept of strong NE [9]. A strong NE is an equilibrium in 
which no coalition of a group of players can be better off by 
deviating from their current strategies simultaneously. In 
repeated games, a strong NE is both a Pareto optimum and a NE 
of the stage game. 
A strategy profile (?̅?1, ⋯ , ?̅?𝑛) and the corresponding payoff 
profile is a strong NE in a n-player repeated game if, for any 
𝑠𝑖
′ ≠ ?̅?𝑖  and 𝑠−𝑖
′ ≠ ?̅?−𝑖,  there are 
TEVC-00118-2015.R1 
 
3 
 
𝑢𝑖(?̅?𝑖 , ?̅?−𝑖) ≥ 𝑢𝑖(𝑠′𝑖 , ?̅?−𝑖)               (5.a) 
𝑢𝑖(?̅?𝑖 , ?̅?−𝑖) ≥ 𝑢𝑖(𝑠′𝑖 , 𝑠′−𝑖)               (5.b) 
 
These inequalities are necessary and sufficient conditions 
for (3) to hold in a selection process. (5.a) is the condition of 
NE while (5.b) is the condition of Pareto optimum. For a 
two-player symmetric game, (5.a) and (5.b) can be simplified 
to  
 
𝑢(?̅?, ?̅?) ≥ 𝑢(𝑠′, ?̅?)            (6.a) 
𝑢(?̅?, ?̅?) ≥ 𝑢(𝑠′, 𝑠′)           (6.b) 
 
The main difficulty in computing a NE of a repeated game is 
that it is difficult to find a suitable expression of the strategies 
of players. There are not only pure strategies and mixed 
strategies, but also reactive strategies that the choice of a player 
at time t is a function of past choices of all players. In iterated 
prisoner’s dilemma, for example, tit for tat [1], grim trigger, 
Pavlov [27], group strategies [28], and newly appeared 
zero-determinant strategies [29] are all reactive strategies, as 
well as those learning and evolving strategies [30-36]. We will 
show in the next section that a group of players in a game can 
coordinate their repeated choices by means of reactive 
strategies, which may lead to equilibria that are not 
characterized by the folk theorem. 
III. REACTIVE STRATEGIES AND LEVEL-K EQUILIBRIUM  
One assumption in classical game theory is that the players 
believe that a deviation in their own strategy will not cause any 
other player’s deviation from their strategies. This is not a 
reasonable assumption in repeated or evolutionary games 
because of the existence of reactive strategies. A player’s 
strategy is reactive if it is a function of some other players’ past 
actions. Here we give a formal definition of a reactive strategy.  
Let ℏ𝑖
𝑡 = (𝑎𝑖
0, 𝑎𝑖
1, ⋯ , 𝑎𝑖
𝑡−1)  be the sequence of actions 
chosen by player 𝑖 ∈ 𝐼  within 𝑡 − 1  periods, and ℏ−𝑖
𝑡 =
(ℏ1
𝑡 , ⋯ ℏ𝑖−1
𝑡 , ℏ𝑖+1
𝑡 , ⋯ , ℏ𝑛
𝑡 ) the past choices made by all players 
other than i. Player i's strategy, 𝑠𝑖, is a reactive strategy when 
there is 
 
𝑠𝑖
𝑡 = {
𝑠𝑖
0 𝑡 = 0
𝑓(ℏ𝑖
𝑡 , ℏ−𝑖
𝑡 ) 𝑡 > 0
         (7) 
 
The strategy in the first stage game, 𝑠𝑖
0 , is either a pure 
strategy or a mixed strategy. Obviously, reactive strategies do 
not exist in one-shot games since there always are ℏ𝑖
𝑡 = ℏ−𝑖
𝑡 =
∅ for any i . 
Reactive strategies provide a way of coordination among a 
group of players in repeated games. In a repeated game with 
multiple Nash equilibria, for example, convergence to a 
designated Nash equilibrium is not guaranteed unless the 
players adopt specific reactive strategies.  
Reactive strategies also provide a way of maintaining 
coordination among a group of players. Grim trigger, for 
example, is a reactive strategy for the players in iterated 
prisoner’s dilemma to maintain mutual cooperation. There 
exists a set of trigger strategies in a repeated game, by which 
the coordination among a group of players can be enforced. 
Once a group of players have coordinated their actions, they 
switch to the trigger strategy that one player will choose the 
minimax strategy if any other player in the group deviates from 
their coordination strategy.  
Coordination among a group of players can be achieved 
when they adopt specific reactive strategies, which may form 
equilibrium in repeated games.  
 
Definition 1: In a repeated n-player game, a level-k 
coordination (2 ≤ 𝑘 ≤ 𝑛) denotes that a group of k players 
coordinate their actions by adopting some trigger strategies 
such that they will change their strategies simultaneously once 
any player in the group deviates from the assigned action. 
The necessary condition of a level-k coordination is that k 
players can be better off by coordinating their actions. Let 𝑣𝑖  
be the minimax payoff of player 𝑖 ∈ 𝐼  and 𝑠𝑖
∗  the minimax 
strategy. Let 𝐾 = {𝑗,⋯ , 𝑗 + 𝑘 − 1} denote a group of k players 
where 𝑗 = 1,⋯ , 𝑛 − 𝑘 + 1 and 𝐾 ∈ 𝐼. The necessary condition 
for a level-k coordination is that there exists a strategy profile 
?̅? = (?̅?1, ?̅?2, ⋯ , ?̅?𝑛) such that, for any 𝑠𝑖 (𝑖 ∈ 𝐾), there are 
 
{
 
 
 
 
𝑣𝑗 < 𝑢𝑗(𝑠1, ⋯ , ?̅?𝑗 , ⋯ , ?̅?𝑗+𝑘−1⏟        
𝑘
, ⋯ , 𝑠𝑛) 
⋮
𝑣𝑗+𝑘−1 < 𝑢𝑗+𝑘−1(𝑠1, ⋯ , ?̅?𝑗 , ⋯ , ?̅?𝑗+𝑘−1⏟        
𝑘
, ⋯ , 𝑠𝑛)
         (8) 
 
A level-k coordination can be maintained if all players 
involved adopt a trigger strategy such as: keep playing the 
coordination strategy if all other players play their coordination 
strategies; otherwise, play the minimax strategy. The best 
responses of the players who do not belong to 𝐾 are determined 
given the strategies of k players who coordinate their actions. 
If the k players cannot further improve their payoffs by 
deviating from ?̅?  simultaneously, the strategy profile ?̅?  is a 
stable state (equilibrium) in the repeated game. This 
equilibrium is different from the concept of NE in that k  
players coordinate their actions. 
 
Definition 2: In an infinitely repeated n-player game, we call it 
a level-k equilibrium (2 ≤ 𝑘 ≤ 𝑛 ) if a group of k players 
coordinate their actions and they have no incentive to deviate 
from their strategies simultaneously. 
A strategy profile ?̅? is a level-k equilibrium if, for any 𝑠′𝑖  
( 𝑖 = 1,⋯ , 𝑗 − 1, 𝑗 + 𝑘,⋯ , 𝑛 ) and 𝑠′𝑗 ≠ ?̅?𝑗 , ⋯ , 𝑠′𝑗+𝑘−1 ≠
?̅?𝑗+𝑘−1, there are 
 
{
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
𝑢𝑗(𝑠
′
1, ⋯ , 𝑠
′
𝑗 , ⋯ , 𝑠
′
𝑗+𝑘−1⏟        
𝑘
, ⋯ , 𝑠′𝑛)  ≤                
                               𝑢𝑗(𝑠′1, ⋯ , ?̅?𝑗 , ⋯ , ?̅?𝑗+𝑘−1⏟        
𝑘
, ⋯ , 𝑠′𝑛)
⋮
𝑢𝑗+𝑘−1(𝑠
′
1, ⋯ , 𝑠
′
𝑗 , ⋯ , 𝑠
′
𝑗+𝑘−1⏟        
𝑘
, ⋯ , 𝑠′𝑛)  ≤               
                         𝑢𝑗+𝑘−1(𝑠1, ⋯ , ?̅?𝑗 , ⋯ , ?̅?𝑗+𝑘−1⏟        
𝑘
, ⋯ , 𝑠𝑛)
      (9) 
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We prove that any level-k equilibrium is also a NE in 
infinitely repeated games. 
 
Theorem 1: In an n-player infinitely repeated game, any 
level-k equilibrium (2 ≤ 𝑘 ≤ 𝑛) is a NE. 
Proof: Let ?̅? denote a level-k equilibrium. We first consider the 
case of 𝑘 = 𝑛 . We have 𝑣𝑖 < 𝑢𝑖(?̅?1, ⋯ , ?̅?𝑛)  for all 𝑖 ∈ 𝐼 . 
According to the folk theorem, ?̅?  is a NE strategy profile. 
In the case of 𝑘 < 𝑛, if 𝑣𝑖 < 𝑢𝑖(?̅?1, ⋯ , ?̅?𝑛)  are satisfied for 
all 𝑖 ∈ 𝐼, ?̅? must be a NE strategy profile according to the folk 
theorem. It is impossible that, for any player i , there is 
𝑣𝑖 > 𝑢𝑖(?̅?1, ⋯ , ?̅?𝑛)  because that player could deviate from ?̅?𝑖 to 
the minimax strategy so that the payoff is guaranteed to be 𝑣𝑖. 
This conflicts with the fact that ?̅?𝑖 is player i’s best response. 
We simply need to consider 𝑣𝑖 = 𝑢𝑖(?̅?1, ⋯ , ?̅?𝑛)  for some 
players 𝑖 ∉ 𝐾.  
Let 𝑀 be the group of players who receive their minimax 
payoffs. Any player 𝑖 ∈ 𝑀 cannot improve his\her payoff by 
deviating from ?̅?𝑖  since ?̅?𝑖  is the best response to ?̅?−𝑖.  
Any player 𝑖 ∈ 𝐾  cannot improve their payoff by deviating 
from ?̅?𝑖. If player i did deviate from ?̅?𝑖 in order to gain a higher 
payoff in the current round, all other members of 𝐾 would play 
their minimax strategies in the future rounds. Player i  will have 
to play the minimax strategy and will receive 𝑣𝑖 in the future 
rounds. Knowing this, player i has no incentive to deviate from 
?̅?𝑖. 
Since any player has no incentive to deviate from ?̅?, it is a 
NE. ■ 
 
Every level-k equilibrium is a NE and a NE is not 
necessarily a level-k equilibrium. Thus, the level-k equilibria 
are refinements of NE in repeated games. The payoff profiles of 
the level-k equilibrium form the Parteto front in an infinitely 
repeated game. We prove the existence of level-k equilibrium 
in general repeated games in proposition 2. 
 
Theorem 2: In an infinitely repeated n-player game, there must 
be at least one level-k equilibrium. 
 
Proof: A game must have at least one NE. We first consider the 
case that a repeated game has only one NE. Let (𝑢1, ⋯ , 𝑢𝑛) 
denote the payoff profile of the NE and (𝑣1, ⋯ , 𝑣𝑛)  the 
minimax payoff profile. There must be 𝑢𝑖 = 𝑣𝑖  for any i 
because, if they are not, the game should have more NE 
according to the folk theorem. Obviously, (𝑢1, ⋯ , 𝑢𝑛)  is a 
level-n equilibrium payoff profile.    
When there exists two or more NE, there must be at least one 
NE that is different from the minimax profile. Let (𝑠1, ⋯ , 𝑠𝑛) 
denote the strategy profile of such a NE. We first prove that 
there must be 𝑣𝑖 < 𝑢𝑖(𝑠1, ⋯ , 𝑠𝑛)  for at least two players. 
Assume that there is 𝑣𝑎 < 𝑢𝑎(𝑠1, ⋯ , 𝑠𝑛) for the player a and 
𝑣𝑖 = 𝑢𝑖(𝑠1, ⋯ , 𝑠𝑛) for any 𝑖 ≠ 𝑎 . Since all players except a 
play their minimax strategies and they have no incentive to 
deviate unilaterally (because (𝑠1, ⋯ , 𝑠𝑛)  is a NE), 𝑠𝑎  is the 
minimax strategy for a. This conflicts with the premise that 
(𝑠1, ⋯ , 𝑠𝑛)  is different from the minimax profile. Thus, there 
must be 𝑣𝑖 < 𝑢𝑖(𝑠1, ⋯ , 𝑠𝑛) for at least two players. 
Suppose that there are 𝑣𝑖 < 𝑢𝑖(𝑠1, ⋯ , 𝑠𝑛)  for k (𝑘 ≥ 2 ) 
players in the NE. If those k players cannot improve their 
payoffs by changing their strategies simultaneously, this NE is 
a level-k equilibrium. Otherwise, there must be a strategy 
profile {𝑠′𝑖} such that those k players cannot further improve 
their payoffs by changing their strategies simultaneously and 
{𝑠′𝑖} is a level-k equilibrium. ■ 
 
A level-k equilibrium is not stable if it is not a NE in the 
stage game because once a player within the coalition changes 
his/her strategy in a level-k equilibrium, all other 𝑘 − 1 players 
will be triggered to change their strategies.  
Some level-k equilibrium can be evolutionary stable. In the 
following section, we give the condition of evolutionarily 
stable states and propose an algorithm to compute 
evolutionarily stable states in n-player symmetric games.  
IV. EVOLUTIONARILY STABLE PAYOFF  
The space of strategy profiles of a repeated game is very 
complicated even for two-player 2 × 2 games. On the other 
hand, the space of payoff profiles is simple. For example, the 
space of payoff profiles of an m-player 𝑛 × 𝑛  game can be 
precisely defined as an m-dimension polyhedron. In this section, 
we study evolutionarily stable state in payoff space rather than 
in strategy space. 
Consider a symmetric two-player game. Let 𝑢(𝑠, 𝑠′) denote 
the payoff for playing strategy s against strategy 𝑠′.  
 
Definition 3: The payoff 𝑢(𝑠, 𝑠) is called evolutionarily stable 
payoff if, for any 𝑠′ ≠ 𝑠 , there are 𝑢(𝑠, 𝑠) ≥ 𝑢(𝑠′, 𝑠)  and 
𝑢(𝑠, 𝑠) ≥ 𝑢(𝑠′, 𝑠′). 
The evolutionarily stable payoff (ESP) is different from the 
concept of ESS in that ESP is defined in payoff space rather 
than in strategy space. The ESP denotes the population payoff 
in the evolutionarily stable state. It is easy to verify that there is 
at most one ESP in a two-player symmetric game. 
An ESP may correspond to a group of strategy profiles, 
rather than a unique strategy profile. In an evolutionarily stable 
state, it is not necessary that all players adopt the same strategy 
even if they receive the same payoff. There might be an 
unlimited set of strategies that the players could adopt in order 
to receive the ESP. 
The ESP is easy to compute because the payoff space of a 
game can be precisely defined. Given the set of NE payoff 
profiles characterized by means of the folk theorem, we simply 
need to check whether or not one point on the Pareto front of 
the set of NE payoff profiles is the ESP, as illustrated in Fig.1. 
The Pareto front intersects with the diagonal at point P. Point P 
represents the subset of NE payoff profiles that satisfy (7.b). 
Point P is the ESP profile if it weakly dominates any other 
payoff profiles within its neighborhood as in the case of Fig. 
1(b). Otherwise, there is no ESP in the game. Based on this idea, 
we propose an algorithm to compute the ESP and/or the Pareto 
front in n-player symmetric games. 
The definition of ESP can be extended to n-player games. 
Let 𝑖 = 1,⋯ , 𝑛  denote the 𝑖𝑡ℎ  player and (𝑢1, ⋯ , 𝑢𝑛)  be a 
payoff profile. Since the game is symmetric, there exists a set of 
payoff profiles that the payoffs of all players are identical, 
𝑢1 = 𝑢2 = ⋯ = 𝑢𝑛  (those profiles located on the main 
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diagonal of the payoff matrix). Let 𝑢 = (?̅?,⋯ , ?̅?) denote the 
payoff profile that every player receives the maximum identical 
payoff ?̅?. We simply need to make clear whether or not 𝑢 is the 
ESP profile. A simple algorithm can compute the ESP and the 
Pareto front. 
 
  
 
Figure 1 In a two-player symmetric game, the set of NE payoff profiles 
characterized by the folk theorem is illustrated by the grid area in the payoff 
space.  X-Y coordinates are the average payoff per round of two players 
respectively. The Pareto front intersects with the diagonal at point P. (a) P is not 
an ESP profile because there exists P’ such that (7.a) is not satisfied.  (b) P is the 
ESP profile. 
 
The profile 𝑢 dominates another profile 𝑢′ = (𝑢′1, ⋯ , 𝑢′𝑛) 
if ?̅? > 𝑢′𝑖 . If 𝑢 dominates every other payoff profile, it is the 
ESP. Otherwise, there is no ESP in the game. Note that we 
simply need to compare 𝑢  with other pure-strategy payoff 
profiles. 
 
 
 
Figure 2 An algorithm to compute ESP and a Pareto optimum of a repeated 
n-player symmetric game. 
 
If 𝑢 is not ESP, it is not necessarily a Pareto optimum. When 
there is ?̅? <
1
𝑛
∑ 𝑢′𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 , 𝑢 must be dominated by some NEs in 
which the players receive the identical payoff 
1
𝑛
∑ 𝑢′𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 . By 
comparing all payoff profiles, we could find the NE payoff 
profile that is also the Pareto optimum for n players. Given that 
each player has m pure strategies, it needs at most 
1
2
𝑛𝑚𝑛 
comparisons. This algorithm can be illustrated by the flowchart 
in Fig. 2. 
Given the Pareto optimum 𝑢 = (?̅?,⋯ , ?̅?), the Pareto front 
can be computed by comparing all pure-strategy payoff profile 
with 𝑢 . A payoff profile 𝑢′ = (𝑢′1, ⋯ , 𝑢′𝑛)  belongs to the 
Pareto front if ?̅? < 𝑢′𝑖  for some i and 𝑢′′𝑖 < 𝑢′𝑖  for any 
𝑢′′ ≠ 𝑢′. 
V. EVOLUTIONARY STABILITY ANALYSIS OF THREE GAMES  
In this section, we compute the evolutionarily stable states of 
three repeated games, the iterated prisoner’s dilemma, a 
coordination game and a three-player symmetric repeated game, 
by means of the proposed methodology in previous sections. 
The iterated prisoner’s dilemma and the coordination game are 
typical repeated games in that the former does not have an ESP 
and the latter has one. The third game acts as a computational 
example to show the efficiency of the proposed algorithm.  
A. Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma 
The prisoner's dilemma (PD) is a two-player non-cooperative 
game in which two players try to maximize their payoffs by 
cooperating with, or betraying the other player. Also an 
n-player version PD is introduced in [37]. A PD can be 
represented as the following matrix (see Fig. 3): 
 
 
 
Figure 3 The payoffs of two players in the prisoner’s dilemma is expressed as a 
matrix. Two players choose between two options, C and D. The values of R, S, 
T, AND P denote Reward for mutual cooperation, Sucker's payoff, Temptation 
to defect, and Punishment for mutual defection respectively. 
 
There are two constraints, 𝑇 > 𝑅 > 𝑃 > 𝑆  and 𝑅 > (𝑇 +
𝑆)/2, which motivate each player to play non-cooperatively 
and prevent any incentive to alternate between cooperation and 
defection. 
The "dilemma" faced by the prisoners is that, whatever the 
other does, each is better off defecting than cooperating. 
However, the payoff when both defect is worse for each player 
than the outcome they would have received if they had both 
cooperated. 
Under the assumption of rationality, game theory predicts 
that both players choose to defect and their payoff profile is (P, 
P), which is the unique NE of this game. 
In the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma (IPD) game, two players 
have to choose their mutual strategies repeatedly, and they also 
have a memory of their previous choices and the choices of the 
opponents. IPD has been heavily studied as an ideal model to 
study how cooperation emerges and persists in a 
non-cooperative environment [38-40]. According to the folk 
theorem, any payoff profile that strictly dominates the minimax 
P 
S 
Payoff of X player 
Payoff of   
Y player 
The set of feasible  
payoff profiles  
Pareto frontier P 
P
P 
P
’ 
(a) (b) 
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payoff profile (P, P) is a NE in an infinite length IPD. The grid 
area within ADBC in Fig. 4 illustrates the set of  
 
 
 
Figure 4 The set of payoff profiles of all NE in an infinite length IPD can be 
illustrated by the grid area within ADBC, which is characterized by the folk 
theorem. X-Y coordinates are the average payoff per round of two players 
respectively. Point A denotes the minimax payoff profile and B denotes the 
mutual cooperation payoff profile. The shadow area within AFBE denotes the 
set of feasible payoff profiles.  
 
payoff profiles of all. Any payoff profile on CB and BD is a 
Pareto optimum so that any player cannot improve their payoff 
without reducing the other player’s payoff. 
The Pareto front intersects with the diagonal at B that is the 
mutual cooperation payoff profile. B is not an ESP profile 
because it does not dominate all other payoff profiles, B’ for 
example, in the neighborhood. Thus, no ESP exists in IPD. 
An evolutionary game does not necessarily converge to a 
stable state when there is no ESP. We ran a series of 
simulations to study how evolving players interact with each 
other in evolutionary IPD.  
The evolutionary IPD model reflects the payoffs received by 
players in one generation in terms of copies of themselves 
represented in the next generation. Stochastic universal 
sampling is used to ensure that players produce offspring in 
proportion to payoffs received so that those with higher payoffs 
reproduce at a proportionately higher rate than those with lower 
payoffs. We set 𝑅 = 3 , 𝑆 = 0 , 𝑇 = 5 , and 𝑃 = 1  in our 
simulations. Every player plays 50 rounds of IPD against all 
other players in the population in each generation. The fitness 
of an individual player is expressed by average payoff per 
round. The parents simply copy their strategies to produce 
offspring and neither mutation nor crossover is carried out. 
An evolving player adjusts their strategy in order to adapt to 
the evolutionary dynamics. Let (𝜌𝑅 , 𝜌𝑇 , 𝜌𝑆, 𝜌𝑃) denote an IPD 
strategy where 𝜌𝑥 (𝑥 = 𝑅, 𝑇, 𝑆, 𝑃) is the probability of choosing 
C given that the payoff in previous round is x. The evolving 
players in our simulations update 𝜌𝑥 every round according to  
 
𝜌𝑥(𝑡) = 𝜌𝑥(𝑡 − 1) + Δ             (10) 
Δ = −Δ    if 𝑢 < ?̅?                (11) 
 
where Δ is a small constant value, ?̅? is the average payoff and 𝑢 
is the average payoff in the past five rounds. The idea is that, if 
a change of 𝜌𝑥 leads to a higher payoff, keep changing it in that 
direction. Otherwise, change 𝜌𝑥 in the opposite direction. Note 
that  𝜌𝑥(𝑡) ∈ [0, 1] and it was bounded if the computed value 
exceeded the limits. 
In each evolutionary IPD game, we choose two evolving 
players randomly (by randomly setting the initial values of 𝜌𝑥) 
and generate a population of 20 individuals. Each strategy has 
10 copies. The population evolves for 2,000 generations.  
Some typical results are shown in Fig. 5 (a)-(d). In some 
situations, the evolution converges to stable states where two 
players receive equal payoffs, such as Fig. 5 (a) and (b). In 
other situations, one player is dominated by another player, 
such as Fig. 5 (c) and (d).  
As the outcome of any single game is affected by chance, we 
repeat the evolutionary IPD for 1,000 times. The payoff profiles 
of two evolving players in 1,000 games are shown in Fig. 6. 
They distribute in the whole area of feasible payoff profiles, 
which shows the diversity and instability of evolutionary IPD 
games. The evolutionary dynamics is significantly influenced 
by the initial strategy combination of the population.  
 
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
 
(c) 
A 
B 
C 
E 
Payoff of X player 
Payoff of   
Y player 
D 
The set of payoff profiles of 
all NE in an IPD 
F 
0 P R T 
T 
R 
P 
Pareto front 
B 
B
’ 
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(d) 
 
Figure 5 Typical results of evolutionary IPD games where two evolving players 
compete against each other. In each evolutionary IPD game, the initial 
population consists of two players and each player has 10 copies. There are 
totally 20 individuals. The population evolves for 2,000 generations. The 
payoffs shown in the figure are average payoffs of 10 copies in the game. 
 
 
 
Figure 6 Payoff profiles in 1,000 evolutionary IPD games. Each diamond in the 
figure illustrates a pair of payoffs received by two players in an IPD. 
 
B. A Coordination Game 
Consider a coordination game with the payoff matrix as 
shown in Fig. 7. There are two pure-strategy NEs in this game 
when one player chooses L and the other chooses R. The 
players do not have any a priori knowledge about which NE 
strategy profile to choose. The probability that any NE is 
achieved is 0.5 no matter what pure or mixed strategies are 
adopted. 
 
 
 
Figure 7 Payoff matrix in a coordination game. Two players choose between 
two options, L and R.   
 
If this game is played repeatedly, it may converge to a NE 
given that some reactive strategies are adopted. The 
coordination between X and Y can be achieved with probability 
𝜌 → 1 in an infinite repeated coordination game if two players 
adopt the below strategies: 
 
𝑠𝑋
𝑡 = {
𝐿 if X chose 𝐿 and Y chose 𝑅 at time 𝑡 − 1
𝑅 if Y chose 𝐿 and X chose 𝑅 at time  𝑡 − 1
𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑{𝐿, 𝑅} otherwise
 
 
𝑠𝑌
𝑡 = {
𝑅 if X chose 𝐿 and Y chose 𝑅 at time 𝑡 − 1
𝐿 if Y chose 𝐿 and X chose 𝑅 at time  𝑡 − 1
𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑{𝐿, 𝑅} otherwise
 
 
The set of NE payoff profiles is represented by a line 
segment in X-Y coordinates as shown in Fig. 8. The endpoint A 
denotes the ESP profile, which corresponds to two 
pure-strategy NEs. The two NEs are evolutionarily stable 
states.  
 
 
Figure 8 The set of NE payoff profiles in repeated coordination game is a line 
segment. The endpoint A is the ESP profile. 
 
In a repeated game where the ESP exists, no payoff profile 
can be Pareto superior to the ESP. Thus, the Pareto front of the 
set of NE payoff profiles is simply a point, the ESP. The 
strategy profile corresponding to the ESP is dominant and no 
player has incentive to deviate from it.  
When a game has an ESP, the evolutionary dynamic 
inevitably converges to a stable state so that every player 
receives the ESP. The ESP denotes the highest payoff each 
player could obtain and thus neither an individual player nor a 
coalition of players has an incentive to deviate from it.  
 
C. A Three-player Symmetric Game 
In this game, three players, X, Y, and Z, play a strategic 
game. Each player chooses a number in the range of (0, 1] 
independently. Let 𝑠𝑋, 𝑠𝑌, and 𝑠𝑍 denote three players’ choices. 
Their payoffs are determined by 
 
  𝑢𝑖 = {
𝑠𝑖 if 𝑠𝑋
2 + 𝑠𝑌
2 + 𝑠𝑍
2 ≤ 1
0 otherwise
   (𝑖 = 𝑋, 𝑌, 𝑍) 
 
This is a quadratic version of Divide-the-Dollar Game [46]. 
Assume that the players can only choose between the multiples 
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of 0.01. Thus, each player has 100 pure strategies and there are 
totally 106 pure-strategy payoff profiles.  
The algorithm to compute the ESP and the Pareto front was 
coded in Visual C++ and run on a PC with dual 2.66GHz Intel 
CPU and 3.25GB RAM. It took approximately 0.023 second to 
compute the ESP and 17 seconds to compute the Pareto front. 
The intersection of the axis of symmetry and the hull of feasible 
payoff profiles is computed to be (0.55, 0.61, 0.57), which is 
close to the theoretically solution (√3/3, √3/3, √3/3). This 
payoff profile is not an ESP and thus this game has no ESP. The 
computed Pareto front contains 7,535 payoff profiles, as shown 
in Fig. 9.  
 
 
 
Figure 9 The computed Pareto front forms a part of unit sphere in the first 
quadrant. 
 
We also run a simulation to show that the payoff profile 
(√3/3, √3/3, √3/3) is a stable state for evolving players. In 
the simulation, three evolving players play against each other in 
an infinitely repeated game. Each evolving player starts with a 
random choice in the first round and then adjusts the choices in 
such a way: if a change has led to an increased payoff, keep 
changing the choices in this direction. Otherwise change the 
choices in the opposite direction. Payoffs of three players in 
1,000 rounds are shown in Fig. 10. It shows that the evolving 
players tend to make identical choices even if they are different 
at the beginning of the game. 
 
 
 
Figure 10 Payoffs of three evolving players in 1,000 interactions. 
 
Many games do not have an ESP. The evolutionary dynamic 
of these games may be complex and it is not likely to converge 
to a stable state unless some restrictions are imposed. Generally, 
a game without ESP contains multiple NE and none of those 
NE is dominant. In an IPD game, for example, the NE payoff 
profiles form a convex polygon as shown in Fig. 4. The Pareto 
front (points on CB and BD) denotes a set of level-k 
equilibrium, which dominates those NE that are not Pareto 
optimum. How the players choose between multiple NE, which 
is probably the main reason for chaos and unpredictability in 
evolutionary game dynamics, is still an open question.  
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Stability analysis based on the concept of ESS is flawed in 
that it is difficult to find an expression of possible strategies in a 
repeated game and that ESS is too strict to exist in most 
repeated games. We propose a new stability analysis of 
repeated games and evolutionary games based on a subset of 
NE, which we call them the level-k equilibrium. Evolutionarily 
stable states can be computed in the payoff space rather than in 
the strategy space so that there is no need to search and compare 
strategies in a complicated space.  
Computing a NE of repeated games is difficult because 
computing the minimax profile is NP-hard. The possible payoff 
profiles in an n-player repeated game form an n-D convex 
polyhedron in the payoff space. We prove that some Pareto 
optimums of the hull of the polyhedron, the level-k equilibria, 
are NE payoff profiles. Computing the minimax profile is not 
necessary in computing the level-k equilibria, which means that 
finding specific subset of NE is tractable. 
A strategy profile determines a unique payoff profile, and 
not vice versa. A payoff profile probably corresponds to a set of 
strategy profiles. For example, the players in IPD could 
implement mutual cooperation by adopting the strategies such 
as always cooperate, tit-for-tat, and numerous other strategies. 
Given a payoff profile, there must be at least one strategy 
profile for the players to adopt in order to receive the given 
payoffs. 
The concept of ESP is defined in the payoff space and thus it 
can be easily computed. Generally, the strategy space of a 
repeated game is much more complicated than the payoff space 
when reactive strategies are taken into consideration. Given an 
ESP, there must be at least one corresponding pure strategy 
profile. 
The level-k equilibria can be considered as refinement of NE 
of repeated games. In a level-k equilibrium not only does any 
individual player not have incentive to unilaterally change their 
strategies but also a group of k players has no incentive to 
deviate from it collectively. A level-k equilibrium is not 
necessarily a NE of the stage game because its corresponding 
strategies are reactive strategies which may not exist in 
one-shot games. 
The existence of level-k equilibria may help to explain some 
phenomena in evolution that has not been well explained. 
Experiments have shown that cooperation can emerge and 
persist in multiple levels in the population [41, 42], and 
intermediate choices lead to less mutual cooperation [43]. The 
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level-k equilibrium suggests that cooperation in a local group 
can also be evolutionarily stable. With more intermediate 
choices, the set of level-k equilibrium increases and there are 
more possible evolutionarily stable states, with which the rate 
of cooperation is very likely to decrease because mutual 
cooperation in the whole population is only one of those stable 
states. 
We also propose an algorithm to compute the ESP and the 
Pareto front of n-player symmetric games. The problem of 
computing the ESP can be simplified significantly because the 
convex hulls of feasible payoff profiles are symmetric for 
symmetric games. We simply need to compute the intersection 
point of the Pareto front and the main diagonal, which point 
denotes the possible ESP of the game.  
This research helps to explain why the processes of 
evolution are diverse in some games. In those games where 
there is no ESP, IPD for example, the evolutionary dynamic 
could be complex and the results of evolution are hard to 
predict. We have shown that any feasible payoff profile is 
possible for evolving players in IPD simulations. The existence 
of reactive strategies suggests that individual players could 
coordinate their actions even if there is no communication 
among them, which provides another explanation for collective 
behaviors in evolution.  
Choosing between multiple NE is still an unsolved problem 
in game theory. It is essentially a decision making under 
uncertainty because the subjective preferences of players are 
involved. Fuzzy logic seems to be a promising tool to solve this 
problem by using linguistic preference and fuzzy rules to 
prioritize payoff profiles [44, 45]. This will be the focus of our 
future work. 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT 
We would like to thank Prof. Xin Yao for his insightful 
comments. The research of this paper was supported by the 
Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council UK 
(EPSRC) project EP/H000968/1. 
 
REFERENCES 
[1] Axelrod, R. (1984) The Evolution of Cooperation. ISBN 0-465-02121-2. 
[2] Chong S Y, Humble J, Kendall G, Li J, Yao X (2007) Iterated prisoner’s 
dilemma and evolutionary game theory. In: The iterated prisoners’ 
dilemma: 20 years on. Singapore: World Scientific, Advances in Natural 
Computation 4, 23–62. 
[3] Maynard Smith, J. and Price, G. (1973). The Logic of Animal 
Conflict. Nature, 246 (5427): 15. 
[4] Thomas, B. (1985) On evolutionarily stable sets, Journal of Mathematical 
Biology, 22: 105-115. 
[5] Boyd, R. and Lorberbaum, J. (1987) No pure strategy is evolutionarily 
stable in the repeated Prisoner's Dilemma game, Nature, 327: 58-59. 
[6] Lorberbaum, J. (1994) No strategy is evolutionarily stable in the repeated 
prisoner's dilemma, Journal of Theoretical Biology, 168: 117-130. 
[7] Yao, X. (1996) Evolutionary stability in the N-person iterated prisoner's 
dilemma, BioSystems, 37(3):189-197. 
[8] Maynard Smith, J. (1982) Evolution and the Theory of Games. 
Cambridge University Press. ISBN 0-521-28884-3. 
[9] Cressman, R. (2003) Evolutionary Dynamics and Extensive Form Games 
(Vol.5). The MIT Press. 
[10] Cressman, R. and Tao, Y. (2014) The replicator equation and other game 
dynamics, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 111: 
10810-10817. 
[11] Friedman J. (1971) A non-cooperative equilibrium for supergames. 
Review of Economic Studies 38(1): 1-12. 
[12] Rubinstein, A. (1979) Equilibrium in Supergames with the Overtaking 
Criterion, Journal of Economic Theory, 21: 1–9. 
[13] Gilboa, I. and Zemel, E. (1989) Nash and correlated equilibria: Some 
complexity considerations, Games and Economic Behavior 1:80–93. 
[14] Chen, X. and Deng, X. (2006). Settling the complexity of two-player nash 
equilibrium. In Proc. 47th IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer 
Science, pp. 261–272. 
[15] Daskalakis, C., Goldberg, P. and Papadimitriou, C. (2006). The 
complexity of computing a nash equilibrium. In Proc. 38th ACM 
Symposium on Theory of Computing, pp. 71–78. 
[16] Chen, X., Teng, S. and Valiant, P. (2007) The approximation complexity 
of win-lose games. In Proceedings of the eighteenth annual ACM-SIAM 
symposium on Discrete algorithm. 
[17] Chen, X., Deng, X. and Teng, S. (2006). Computing Nash equilibria: 
Approximation and smoothed complexity. In Proc. 47th IEEE 
Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, pp. 603–612. 
[18] Borgs, C., Chayes, J., Immorlica, N., Kalai, A. T., Mirrokni, V., and 
Papadimitriou, C. (2008) The myth of the folk theorem. In Proceedings of 
the fortieth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing (pp. 
365-372). ACM. 
[19] Halpern, J. Y., Pass, R., and Seeman, L. (2014) The truth behind the myth 
of the folk theorem. In Proceedings of the 5th conference on Innovations 
in theoretical computer science, pp. 543-554. ACM. 
[20] Littman, M. and Stone, P. (2005) A polynomial-time Nash equilibrium 
algorithm for repeated games. Decision Support Systems, 39(1): 55-66. 
[21] Harsanyi, J. (1967) Games with Incomplete Information Played by 
‘Bayesian’ Players, I-III. Management Science, 14: 159-182, 320-334, 
486-502. 
[22] Aumann, R. (1959) Acceptable points in general cooperative n-person 
games in "Contributions to the Theory of Games IV", Princeton Univ. 
Press, Princeton, N.J. 
[23] Moreno, D. and Wooders J. (1996) Coalition-Proof Equilibrium, Games 
and Economic Behavior, 17: 82–112. 
[24] Mertens, J. (2003) Ordinality in Non Cooperative Games, International 
Journal of Game Theory, 32: 387–430 
[25] Govindan, S. and Wilson, R. (2005) Refinements of Nash 
equilibrium. The new Palgrave dictionary of economics, 2. 
[26] Nash, J. (1951) Non-cooperative Games. The Annals of Mathematics, 
54(2):286-295. 
[27] Nowak, M. and Sigmund, K. (1993) A strategy of win-stay, lose-shift that 
outperforms tit-for-tat in the prisoner’s dilemma game. Nature, 364, 
56-58. 
[28] Li, J. and Kendall, G. (2009) A strategy with novel evolutionary features 
for the iterated prisoner’s dilemma, Evolutionary Computation, 17(2): 
257-274. 
[29] Press, W. and Freeman, D. (2012) Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma contains 
strategies that dominate any evolutionary opponent. Proceedings of the 
National Academy of Sciences 109(26): 10409-10413. 
[30] Ishibuchi, H. and Namikawa, N. (2005) Evolution of Iterated Prisoner’s 
Dilemma Game Strategies in Structured Demes Under Random Pairing in 
Game Playing, IEEE Transactions on Evolutionary Computation, 9(6): 
552-561. 
[31] Quek, H., Tan, K., Goh,C. and Abbass, H. (2009) Evolution and 
Incremental Learning in the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma, IEEE 
Transactions on Evolutionary Computation, 13(2): 303-320. 
[32] Mittal, S. and Deb, K. (2009) Optimal Strategies of the Iterated Prisoner’s 
Dilemma Problem for Multiple Conflicting Objectives, IEEE 
Transactions on Evolutionary Computation, 13(3): 554-565. 
[33] Chong, S. and Yao, X. (2005) Behavioral Diversity, Choices and Noise in 
the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma, IEEE Transactions on Evolutionary 
Computation, 9(6): 540-551. 
[34] Chiong, R. and Kirley, M. (2012) Effects of Iterated Interactions in 
Multiplayer Spatial Evolutionary Games, IEEE Transactions on 
Evolutionary Computation, 16(4): 537-555. 
[35] Li, J. and Kendall, G. (2013) Evolutionary stability of discriminating 
behaviors with the presence of kin cheaters, IEEE Transactions on 
Cybernetics, 43(6): 2044-2053. 
[36] Ashlock, D. and Kim, E-Y. (2008) Fingerprinting: Visualization and 
Automatic Analysis of Prisoner’s Dilemma Strategies, IEEE 
Transactions on Evolutionary Computation, 12(5): 647-659. 
[37] Yao, X. and Darwen, P. (1994) An experimental study of N-person 
iterated prisoner's dilemma games, Informatica, 18(4):435--450. 
[38] Ferrierre, R. and Michod, R. (1995) Invading wave of cooperation in a 
spatial iterated prisoner’s dilemma, Proceedings of the Royal Society B, 
259(1354): 77-83. 
TEVC-00118-2015.R1 
 
10 
[39] Nowak, M., Sasaki, A., Taylor, C. and Fudenberg, D. (2004) Emergence 
of cooperation and evolutionary stability in finite populations. Nature, 
428: 646–650. 
[40] Li, J., Hingston, P. and Kendall G. (2011) Engineering design of 
strategies for winning iterated prisoner’s dilemma competitions. IEEE 
Transactions on Computational Intelligence & AI in Games, 3(4): 
348-360. 
[41] Darwen, P. and Yao, X. (2002) Co-Evolution in Iterated Prisoner's 
Dilemma with Intermediate Levels of Cooperation: Application to 
Missile Defense, International Journal of Computational Intelligence 
and Applications, 2(1):83-107. 
[42] Darwen, P. and Yao, X. (2000) Does extra genetic diversity maintain 
escalation in a co-evolutionary arms race, International Journal of 
Knowledge-Based Intelligent Engineering Systems, 4(3):191-200. 
[43] Darwen, P. and Yao, X. (2001) Why More Choices Cause Less 
Cooperation in Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma, Proceedings of the 2001 
Congress on Evolutionary Computation, NJ, USA, pp.987-994. 
[44] Coupland, S. and John, R. (2007) Geometric type-1 and type-2 fuzzy 
logic systems, IEEE Transactions on Fuzzy Systems, 15(1): 3-15. 
[45] Chakeri, A., Habibi, J. and Heshmat, Y. (2008) Fuzzy type-2 Nash 
equilibrium, International Conference on Computational Intelligence for 
Modelling Control & Automation, pp. 398-402. 
[46] Anbarci, N. (2001) Divide-the-dollar game revisited. Theory and 
Decision, 50(4), 295-303. 
[47] Berger, U. (2007) Brown's original fictitious play, Journal of Economic 
Theory, 135:572-578. 
[48] Von Stengel, B. (2012) Rank-1 games with exponentially many Nash 
equilibria. arXiv preprint arXiv:1211.2405. 
[49] Zinkevich, M., Johanson, M., Bowling, M., and Piccione, C. (2007) 
Regret minimization in games with incomplete information. In Advances 
in neural information processing systems, 1729-1736. 
 
 
Jiawei Li (M12) received the B.Sc. and Ph.D. 
degree in engineering from the Harbin Engineering 
University, Harbin, China in 1992 and 1998 
respectively. He became a lecturer in Robotics 
Institute at Harbin Institute of Technology, China in 
1999. Currently, he is a research fellow in the 
School of Computer Science at University of 
Nottingham, Nottingham, U.K. His research 
interests include a number of decision making and 
optimization methodologies including evolutionary 
game theory, fuzzy logic, interval probability 
theory, hyper-heuristics and economic risk benefit analysis. He is especially 
interested in solving complex real world problems by integrating multiple 
decision making methods. 
 
Graham Kendall (M03-SM10) received the 
Bachelor’s degree in computation (1st class, honors) 
from the University of Manchester Institute of 
Science and Technology, Manchester, U.K. in 1997 
and the Ph.D. degree in computer science from the 
University of Nottingham, Nottingham, U.K., in 
2001. His previous experience includes almost 20 
years in the Information Technology industry 
where he held both technical and managerial 
positions. He is a Professor of Computer Science at 
University of Nottingham and is currently based at 
their Malaysia Campus where he holds the position of Vice-Provost (Research 
and Knowledge Transfer). He is a Director of two companies (EventMAP Ltd., 
Nottingham, U.K.; Aptia Solutions Ltd., Nottingham, U.K.) and CEO of two 
companies (MyRIAD Solutions Sdn Bhd, Malaysia and MyResearch Sdn Bhd, 
Malaysia). He is a Fellow of the Operational Research Society. He is the 
editor-in-chief of the IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON COMPUTATIONAL 
INTELLIGENCE AND AI IN GAMES and an Associate Editor of eight 
international journals, including the IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON 
EVOLUTIONARY COMPUTATION. He chaired the Multidisciplinary 
International Conference on Scheduling: Theory and Applications in 2003, 
2005, 2007, 2009, and 2011, and has chaired several other international 
conferences, which has included establishing the IEEE Symposium on 
Computational Intelligence and Games. He has been awarded externally funded 
grants worth over £6 million from a variety of sources including Engineering 
and Physical Sciences Research Council (EPSRC) and commercial 
organizations. 
 
Robert John has a BSc Mathematics, a MSc in 
Statistics and a PhD in Fuzzy Logic. He worked in 
industry for 10 years as a mathematician and 
knowledge engineer developing knowledge based 
systems for British Gas and the financial services 
industry. Bob spent 24 years at De Montfort 
University in various roles including Head of 
Department, Head of School and Deputy Dean. He 
led the Centre for Computational Intelligence 
research group from 2001 until 2012. He has over 
150 research publications of which about 50 are in 
international journals. Bob joined the University of Nottingham in 2013 where 
he heads up the research group ASAP in the School of Computer Science. The 
Automated Scheduling, Optimisation and Planning (ASAP) research group 
carries out multi-disciplinary research into mathematical models and 
algorithms for a variety of real world optimisation problems. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
